The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of decision frame, decision justification on risky choice. Subjects were 158 men and women. The results were as follows.(I) In the condition where no justification was requested, a framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) was observed: Most of the subjects chose the riskless option when decision options were phrased positively in terms of gains, whereas most of the subjects chose the risky option when options were phrased negatively in terms of losses. (2) However, in the condition where justification was requested, the framing effect was not observed: Most of the subjects showed a consistent choice pattern. (3) The subjects in the justification-requested condition tended to choose risky option more often than the subjects in the no justificationrequested condition did.
Recent research on human decision making identified the importance of the "decision frame" in determining choice behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) . The term "decision frame" has been used to describe the internal representation that an individual has for a paticular decision problem. They described the concept of decision frame "to refer to the decision maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453.) . Tversky and Kahneman (1981) reported a large effect of the decision frame on choice. When decision options were phrased positively in terms of gains, most people chose the sure thing. But, when options were phrased negatively in terms of losses, most people chose risky option. This phenomenon has been called "framing effect". The essential feature of the framing effect as described by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) was a reversal in the majority choices. They argued that this preference reversal occured because the alternative framings caused subjects to view the outcomes as gains in the positive frame and as losses in the negative frame.
The effect of variations in framing is illustrated in version 1 and version 2 for a same decision problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, p. 166) . Subjects were presented with the following two versions of problem.
Version 1 (Positive frame version). "Imagine that in addition to whatever else you have, you have been given a cash gift of $200. You are now asked to choose between (a) a sure gain of $50 and (b) a 25 percent chance of winning $200 and a 75 percent chance of winning nothing." Version 2 (Negative frame version)."Imagine that in addition to whatever else you have, you have been given a cash gift of $400. You are now asked to choose between (c) a sure loss of $150 and (d) a 75 percent chance of losing $200 and a 25 percent chance of losing nothing." Kahneman and Tversky (1982) reported that most people made a risk averse choice prefering the sure gain (a) over the gamble (b) in the version 1, and that most people had a Tversky and Kahneman suggested that the two versions induce subjects to adopt different decision frames (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) . Although they reported that the framing effect was robust phenomenon, a contradictory finding which did not replicated the framing effect was obtained (Fargley & Miller, 1987; Takemura, 1992) . This contradiction of the findings indicated a possibility that problem characteristics or task requirements were important in whether or not the framing effect was observed. In fact, Takemura (1992) found a significant effect of decision time on framing of decision. In his study, the framing effect was not observed in the condition where decision makers thought about decision problems for a relatively long time, although the framing effect was observed in the condition where decision makers thought about decision problems for a relatively short time.
Recently, a number of decision researchers have advanced the idea that individual choice behavior under uncertainty can be better understood from the point of view of the decision justifications for and against each option. For example, Montgomery (1983, p. 343) suggested that decision makers determined that they were prepared to make a choice when they found "arguments strong enough for making decision". Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) found that the request to justify one's judgment to oneself instead of other people changed the judgment process towards a more analytical mode of behavior. Although the work by Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) was the study on judgment process rather than decision making, it was expected that decision justification led to more analytical information processing and weakened the framing effect. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) explained why the framing effect should occur in terms of prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . In prospect theory, the decision making process is divided into two phases: an editing phase responsible for developing a decision frame and an evaluation phase during which the framed course of action are evaluated as a basis for choice. According to prospect theory, the framing effect is mainly dependent on the process of editing phase. It is predicted that the framing effect was not observed only in the justification requested condition because the decision justification led to analytical mode of information processing in the editing phase.
Accordingly, it was hypothesized as follows. Hypothesis 1. In the condition where no justification was requested, the framing effect would be observed: When decision options would be phrased positively in terms of gains, the most of subjects would choose the riskless option. But, when options would be phrased negatively in terms of losses, most of subjects would choose risky option.
Hypothesis 2. In the condition where justification was requested, the framing effect would not be observed: The most of subjects would show a consistent choice pattern.
Method
Subjects. One hundred and fifty-eight undergraduate students at Doshisha University and at Koka Women's College participated in the experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned into one of the two conditions:(1) the justification-requested condition (79 sub-jects: 37 women and 42 men), and (2) the no justification-requested condition (79 subjects: 44 women and 35 men).
Materials. A monetary decision problem was used to measure subjects' choices between riskless and risky options. This was basically identical with the problems by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) . As in their study, two framing of the decision problem were created. One was positive frame version, and the other was negative frame version. The two versions of problem were as follows.
Version 1 (Positive frame version)."Imagine that in addition to whatever else you have, you have been given a cash gift of 20 000 yen. You are now asked to choose between (a) a sure gain of 5 000 yen and (b) a 25 percent chance of winning 20 000 yen and a 75 percent chance of winning nothing." Version 2 (Negative frame version). "Imagine that in addition to whatever else you have, you have been given a cash gift of 40 000 yen. You are now asked to choose between (a) a sure loss of 15 000 yen and (b) a 75 percent chance of losing 20 000 yen and a 25 percent chance of losing nothing."
Procedure. Subjects were asked to complete a questionaire. The questionaire consisted of the two versions of problems. The presentation order of two versions was randomized.2 In the justification-requested condition, the subjects were asked to think about the justification of decision, and were told that after completing each decision they had to write down the content of justification in openended manner. All subjects in the condition wrote the justification of decision. On the other hand, in the no justification-requested condition, the subjects were asked only to choose between two options in each version. All experimental sessions took place in groups of about 10 persons.
Results and Discussion Table 1 presents the number of subjects choosing the riskless and the risky options for each version of the problem in each condition. As shown in Table 1 , a pattern of choice in the no justification-requested condition differed from a pattern of choice in the justification-requested condition.
In the no justification-requested condition, 65.8 percent of subjects preferred the riskless option for version 1, while 63.3 percent of them preferred the risky option for version 2. The statistical tests revealed that a significandy high percentage of subjects chosed the sure option for version 1 (x= 7.91, df= 1, p<.01) whereas a significantly high percentage of subjects chosed the risky option for version 2 (x2= 5.58, df= 1, p<.05). These findings were consistent with the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and supported Hypothesis 1.
In the justification-requested condition, 54.4 percent of subjects preferred the risky option for version 1, while 81.0 percent of them preferred the risky option for version 2. The statistical tests revealed that there was no significant difference between percentages of risky and riskless choices for version 1 (x2=.62, df= 1, ns) and that a significantly high percentage of subjects chosed the risky option for version 2 (x2= 30.39, df= 1, p<.001). These findings were not consistent with the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and partly supported Hypothesis 2. Table 2 presents the frequency of choice patterns between positive and negative versions in each condition. In order to examine the consistency between responses for version 1 and version 2 of the problem, statistical tests were performed. The risk-seeking orientation for version 1 was positively related to the risk-seeking orientation for version 2 in the justification requested condition (x2= 8.85, df= 1, p<.01), whereas the risk-2 In order to check the order-effect of presentation on decision, statistical tests were undertaken. The tests revealed no significant order-effect for version I (x2= 1.84, df= 1, ns) and version 2 (x2=.16, df= 1, ns). Table 1 Frequency of subjects choosing the riskless and risky options for the two versions of the problem in each condition seeking orientation for version 1 was not significantly related to that for version 2 in the no justification-requested condition (x2=.20, df= 1, ns). Fifty-two subjects (65.8 percent of 79 subjects) showed the consistent pattern of preference in the justification requested condition, whereas thirty-eight subjects (48.1 percent of 79 subjects) showed the consistent pattern of preference in the no justification-requested condition. The statistical test revealed that the subjects in the justification-requested condition showed the consistent choice pattern more frequently than the subjects in the no justification-requested condition did (X2= 5.06, df= 1, p<.05). These findings supported Hypothesis 2.
Lastly, the data of the present study indicated an unexpected but interesting phenomenon that the subjects tended to choose risky option more often in the justification-requested condition than in the no justification requested condition. For both version 1 and version 2, the subjects in the justification-requested condition chose risky option more often than the subjects in the no justificationrequested condition did (version 1: X2= 6.57, df= 1, p<.05; version 2: X2= 6.17, df= 1, p<.05). This phenomenon suggested that more justification or more thought created more risky orientation in individual decisionmaking like risky shift in group decision making as shown by Kogan and Wallach (1975) .
Conclusion
The purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of decision frame, decision justification on risky choice. In the condition where no justification was requested, the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) was observed. On the contrary, in the condition where justification was requested, the framing effect was not observed. Most of the subjects showed the consistent choice pattern and did not show the preference reversal. These results supported Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 of the present study. It was concluded that the framing effect was limited to situations where no justification was requested.
Interestingly, a result of analysis for the content of justification indicated that most of the subjects (75 subjects, 94.9 percent in the justification-requested condition) justified one's decision verbally even in the decision problem which could be easily represented by mathematical expected values. This result suggested that decision problem tended to be framed verbally rather than numerically even in the justification-requested condition.
In addition to the findings regarding the hypotheses, the data of the present study indicated another interesting phenomenon that the subjects tended to choose risky option more often in the justification-requested condition than in the no justification-requested condition. Further studies that investigate why the risky orientation was observed in the justification-requested condition are needed.
